Since its modern genesis, the claim to sovereignty has been inherently tied to the notion of freedom: from the Church, from empires, from colonial powers. More specifically, the freedom that sovereignty promised was the freedom "to be left alone," given the premise that unfettered sovereignty was a necessary and sufficient condition for the people and its members to enjoy the freedom "to do, or be, this rather than that." But in our era of global governance the freedom to be left alone no longer holds the promise of providing citizens with control over their lives because no Chinese walls will be capable of insulating communities from the outside. States that seek to ensure freedom to their citizens must act proactively by engaging foreign and international governance bodies, and by ensuring opportunities for their citizens to do the same. And in fact, states that participate in the robust exchange between global, regional and local policy makers retain their promise of ensuring to their citizens the opportunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" in an interdependent world. This contribution analyzes the costs and benefits that accrue to states from the emerging system of global governance and assesses the potential contributions of state organs to the effectiveness and democratization of the global processes of decision-making and review. It ends by outlining some normative implications of this type of "engaged sovereignty" which recognizes its embeddedness in a global order to which it is accountable.
succinctly, " [s] overeignty articulates the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one's life in one's own hands." 8 This emphasis on external freedom gained prominence in the early nineteenth century, and was reflected in domestic constitutional law that assumed that the state had the unlimited freedom to "make or unmake any law whatever," 9 and in international law that was based solely on state consent, and which stopped at the states' borders, incapable of intervening in states' internal affairs. 10 But to the extent that this premise was valid, it no longer holds even for relatively affluent collectives. As the various contributions to this book have demonstrated, global governance bodies -public, private and mixed -continue to shrink the regulatory space of national governments, and to limit the traditional powers of the state to adjudicate and enforce. Today's economic and social realities leave us little choice. 11 But at the same time, at least some key state actors refuse to give up power and therefore devise various means to retain their authority and protect the interests of at least some of their constituencies. The outcome is a restless, complex web of regulatory bodies that must negotiate and accommodate each other's interests in order to remain effective.
Only a few states that can afford (or at least claim to be able to afford) to cling to the traditional freedom from claim of "sovereignty as independence." China, most notably, still hail the so called "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence" which reflect the classic nineteenth century vision of sovereignty. 12 For most peoples and individuals, however, the perception of sovereignty as defined by consent and non-interference no longer promises full freedom and hence no longer reflects the expectations and actions of many state and non-state actors. Interdependency prevents us from imagining ourselves ensconced in isolated mansions-states. We increasingly realize that states are no more -and, indeed, no less -than owners of small apartments in one densely packed high-rise in which about two hundred families live. 13 In this global condominium, the "technology" of global governance that operates through discrete sovereign entities to ensure the freedom from no longer fits, if it ever worked. The freedom from does no longer hold the promise of providing citizens with control over their lives and the environment surrounding them because communities cannot insulate themselves from the world surrounding them. No Chinese walls will be capable of fending off the consequences of climate change. Even more importantly, permeable borders have become the signifiers of freedom: the free movement of goods, people, etc. People have realized that "the right to exit" -the ability of certain voters to influence collective choices by threatening with moving to other jurisdictions (e.g. high income tax for the super-rich) -can be as effective as -in some instances even more effective than -"the right to voice." 14 Facing external threats as well as attractions, states must act proactively, exercising their and their citizens' freedom to, in order to secure for themselves an autonomous space, free from external imposition. Hence the justification for state authority, its promise to ensure the positive freedom to for the respective citizens, requires state organs to actively engage with the emerging global actors and provide opportunities for their citizens to do the same.
Part II of this chapter outlines the limitations on states' discretion that complicates stats' ability to ensure democratic freedom in the traditional, nineteenth century sense. Part III describes responses of state organs to this challenge. Part IV draws the contours of the normative implications of sovereignty which is embedded in a global order that must ensure freedom to all, and suggests that such implications could soon be reflected in positive law. Part V concludes. In this age of global governance, external constraints on states have become ubiquitous as they have become strict (even while being formally "soft" norms).
II. Assessing the impact of the Global Regulatory Space on Sovereign Discretion
State authorities have in recent years willfully, unwillingly or even unwittingly surrendered regulatory discretion to various forms of public and private, formal and informal, international and a-national institutions. They yielded their monopoly on regulatory power -what traditionally defined sovereignty -to actors whose reach defies political boundaries. These global governance bodies (GGBs) now set policies in almost all aspects of life, including in the areas of financial stability, financial markets regulation, development, environment, transportation, intellectual property, labor standards, public health, food safety, communications and so on. These GGBs shape the rights, interests, expectations and life opportunities of diverse stakeholders across political boundaries through formal norms (international institutions set up by treaties), informal coordination among state executives, partnerships between public and private bodies, and purely private standard-setting bodies. 15 Even their right to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources" is subject to external scrutiny for compliance with WTO law. 16 The freedom of states has been significantly delimited both substantively and institutionally. States' "domestic" sphere has shrunk most conspicuously in the context of what traditionally was their central claim to monopoly of power: their internal monopoly on the exercise of violence. The human rights revolution has redefined sovereignty not only in relation to peacetime exercise of public authority but also transformed the law applicable to internal armed conflicts that challenge governmental authority. This is witnessed by the dramatic rise of international criminal adjudication since the mid-1990s that contributed to the impressive evolution of the law on non-international armed conflicts. 17 The concept of Jus Cogens stipulates that state's unfettered discretion is no longer the premise, and the Responsibility to Protect principle indicates that sovereignty entails significant substantive obligations toward their own citizens and also globally. Sovereigns are no longer defined by their authority to decide freely on the exception, but more and more by their responsibility towards their citizens and toward others that are affected by the sovereigns' acts or omissions.
Even more profoundly, states' discretion has become subjected to meaningful institutional constraints. The need to resolve regional and global coordination and cooperation problems intensified the intrusion of global regulation on states' freedom. This global drive to regulate state behavior both substantively and institutionally meets states that have come to be heavily dependent on the market forces of globalization which has increases the dependency of most states on non-state and foreign actors. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the continuous lowering of the technical and legal barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital across territorial boundaries has exacerbated the well-known failures inherent in domestic democratic processes. This process has operated to further marginalize the voices of "discrete and insular minorities" due to increased demand on their traditional resources (e.g., the "land grabbing" phenomenon since 2008). At the same time, the lowering of barriers on movement strengthened the hand of those domestic actors who could benefit from the increased availability of "exit" options from the state; for example, by relocating themselves or their investments, which are options that globalization offered. The threatened "exit" by these actors has increased their "voice" at the expense of the diffuse majority.
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A second factor that operated to increase state dependency on foreign actors springs from the fact that most small and medium-size states compete for foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Divided by political boundaries and high levels of political, social, and economic heterogeneity, most states find it difficult to act collectively. This often makes it relatively easy for a strong economic or political actor-be it a powerful state or a wealthy investor-to practice "divide and rule" strategies against the states. These strategies further erode the capacity of weak sovereigns for collective action and effectively confine them to different "'cells" in a maze of prisoners' dilemmas. 20 The proliferation of informal and privatized standard-setting bodies further increased the leverage of multinational corporations and disadvantaged diffuse domestic electorates.
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All these factors suggest that the promise of sovereign independence as the freedom from, as a necessary and sufficient condition for exercising the freedom to, has become in our times a false promise. To this one should add the fact that in many cases there is a lack of congruence between the group of enfranchised voters and the group of those affected by the voters' decisions. The basic assumption of state democracy-that there is a strong overlap between these two populations-might have been correct in a world of "separate mansions," when territorial boundaries defined not only the persons entitled to vote but also the community that was primarily affected by the choices made. Today, however, this condition is rarely met, and the consequences manifest themselves in two negative ways. First, voters in one country adopt policies that spill over beyond their states without the affected stakeholders having the opportunity to participate in the vote or to otherwise influence the decisions that are taken. 22 Second, foreign actors increasingly employ economic leverage to influence both candidates and domestic public opinion in other states. While this phenomenon may temporarily compensate for the foreigners' lack of voting rights, it operates to distort the domestic democratic process in the target states and to disenfranchise their citizens.
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Due to all these factors, the age of global governance poses a severe challenge to domestic democratic processes. It shatters the traditional premise that sovereignty as freedom from can ensure its citizens the freedom to. In general, the transfer of authority to global bodies has eroded the traditional constitutional checks and balances found in many democracies, as well as other domestic oversight and 20 Benvenisti and Downs (supra note 18 monitoring mechanisms of executive discretion, and thereby reduced voters' ability to promote their preferences through the political system.
(b) Benefits: The Democratic Gains Accrued by the Global Regulatory Space
The picture painted so far is only partial. The ramifications of global constraints on sovereign discretion are not necessarily negative. For the era of global governance offers at the same time an opportunity to reshape the traditional checks and balances and adapt them to the changing conditions. If the primary goal is to promote the freedom to, then globalization opens up new possibilities for securing it. I will not dwell here on the opportunities individuals and communities have to voice their concerns and monitor GGBs. 25 In this context I will draw attention to two mechanisms through which GGBs help secure domestic democratic processes. There are mainly two ways by which GGBs can secure the wishes of domestic voters that would otherwise be threatened by the forces of globalization. First, there are GGBs that enforce domestic commitments against their detractors; Second, there are GGBs that are sufficiently robust to engage with other global actors, thereby remedying states' powerlessness. President's constitutional authority. 27 The same Committee recently managed to convince the Tel Aviv municipality to withstand the pressure of land developers whose initiatives threatened the architectural landscape of the "White City," a recognized world heritage site by the UNESCO Convention. 28 States opt for effective global mechanisms of review for the same reasons that they agree on domestic constraints on politics: to tie their own hands (e.g., the efforts of the Labor in Britain to establish the European Court of Human Rights and later on accepting its jurisdiction, all designed to constrain their domestic political rival), 29 to enhance domestic fiscal discipline (e.g., by joining the OECD, by adopting FATF Recommendations), or to ensure their competitors are equally committed to pursue collective efforts (e.g., trade liberalization and intellectual property protection under the WTO). 30 The second institutional benefit states derive from GGBs is the GGBs' ability to overcome the prisoner's dilemma situation that competing national regulators face. As mentioned above, states often cave in to demands of a powerful state or a multinational company. For example, the global sports industry obtains immunity from domestic control by insisting on the private character of sporting events but mainly by threatening to boycott athletes from countries that insist on regulating sport activities. A similar problem is created by international organizations when they seek to establish headquarters in a certain jurisdiction but demand that the host state recognize their total immunity from domestic law and courts. In both cases, the European courts -rather than national regulators or national courtshave proven quite successful in offering resistance and indirectly imposing regulation on those global actors. checks and balances. 37 Characteristically is the position of the German Constitutional Court which has on the one hand recognized that sovereignty is "freedom that is organised by international law and committed to it," 38 yet at the same time moved to ensure democratic controls over global bodies as well as their compliance with human rights obligations.
This system, which, like the domestic constitutional systems, benefits from constant competition between institutions, promises stability through friction. While relatively weaker states are less likely to have significant influence on these emerging checks on decision-making, those checks offer their best available protection, compared to a lawless environment that is exploited by powerful external actors who play one weak state against another.
This evolving global system may perhaps reflect Kant's vision of an international society forced to move slowly and in a non-linear fashion "from the lawless condition of savages into a league of nations." 39 Counter-intuitively, it is people's natural antagonism that yields cooperation, first at the national level and later on at the global level:
he same unsociability which drives man to [the creation of a commonwealth] causes any single commonwealth to stand in unrestricted freedom in relation to others; consequently, each of them must expect from another precisely the evil which oppressed the individuals and forced them to enter into a lawful civic state. The friction among men, the inevitable antagonism, which is a mark of even the largest societies and political bodies, is used by Nature as a means to establish a condition of quiet and security."
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In an interdependent world, states can act proactively in response to global regulation or the lack of it. By acting unilaterally states often seek to influence outcomes and thereby promote their voters' preferences. They do so first by prescribing norms designed to modify the behavior of outsiders, and second by reviewing the acts or omissions of GGBs. In these two ways, states -mostly, powerful states -take an active role in global regulation. is not a novel phenomenon. Already in the early nineteenth century, Great Britain resorted unilaterally to ban the slave trade. 42 In recent years, this type of normmaking has spread. The United States imposes sanctions on all actors, public and private, including foreign ones, who do not comply with the US's rules on illegal trafficking in humans. 43 The US also imposed trade restrictions on all those engaged in the harvest of shrimp or the catch of tuna to protect endangers species around the world. 44 Its Food and Drug Administration (FDA) demands that all non-U.S. clinical drug trials comply with FDA regulations. 45 The EU, in turn, required any oil tanker visiting a port with the EU area, irrespective of their flag, to have a double-hull design, 46 or, most recently, demands that non-EU air carriers landing in EU territory take part in the EU carbon emissions scheme which would apply also to those segments flown outside the EU area. 47 One could add to this list also the rendering of global law enforcement services like the extension antibribery 48 legislation to the global arena, or the extension of the courts' jurisdiction to foreign events, as in the case of the Alien Torts Statute (ATS). 49 While most of these acts were prescribed by developed countries, there are also similar acts by the developing South.
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What is common to these and other unilateral regulatory efforts of this type is their aim: the unilateral attempt to prevent or remedy collective action failures that produce global public "bads." 51 A key characteristic of this type of "legislation for humanity" is the net burdens that it imposes on domestic producers and consumers in addition to the equivalent burdens it imposes on foreigners. 52 Unlike the unilateral extension of the continental shelf or exclusive economic zone that may also be motivated by global welfare concerns but also carry benefits to the regulating state, the above examples do not offer exclusive benefits for the regulating state. Instead, they level the playing field by demanding competitors to abide by the same or equivalent constraints. 53 The second proactive role of state organs is characterized by their review of GGB decisions and policies. One challenge of global governance is the availability of the review function that keeps decisionmakers from deviating from the goals they are expected to pursue. Theoretically, the rise of global governance opens up numerous opportunities for review: the plurality of GGBs engaging in robust "peer review" of each other. But this is just (bad) theory. As we know from domestic experiences, the review function depends on a strong incentive of the reviewed to accept it. interests, those key actors would have little interest in being subjected to effective external review. They will not voluntarily provide it, and if they do, they will ensure that they control the identity and tenure of the reviewers (judges, ombudspersons, comptrollers). As a result, the great potential for GGB peer review is yet to materialize. But this void is being filled, at least partly, by the review functions of state organs: legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts.
While legislatures rarely take an active part in global policymaking 55 and have limited opportunities to review the policies of global bodies, 56 there are already a few exceptions. One notable exception is the U.S. Congress, whose influence in this context has been noted and analyzed. 57 As Kristina Daugirdas suggests, Congress's ability to influence global bodies is a function of the dependency of those bodies on U.S. funding. 58 In fact, the U.S. Congress has used this leverage by withholding U.S. funding from IGOs like the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO. Most recently the Swiss Parliament has passed a law that strengthened the oversight of more than 60 global sports associations based there, including the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). 59 The so-called "Lex FIFA" designates the top officials of the sports associations residing in Switzerland as "Politically Exposed Persons" who, according to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) rules could be subjected to corruption investigations. Thus far sports bodies based in Switzerland were not obliged to register with the state or to publish their accounts. They benefitted from tax breaks, autonomy to govern their own affairs, and exemption from Swiss anti-corruption laws, and effectively enjoyed immunity that led to impunity. 60 Domestic administrative agencies that implement global standards have opportunities under domestic law to filter out standards that they deem incompatible with domestic law or in conflict with local interests. The question is whether national agencies will use their internal procedures not to avoid compliance, but rather to press the global actor to become more accountable and promote global interests and concerns. The limited experience accumulated thus far suggests an interesting dichotomy. While several agencies do open their internal policy-making procedures to private stakeholders (including foreign ones) in their preparations for the meetings of the global body, thereby enabling domestic actors to shape the agency's position at the global level, 61 they would be less open to including civil society and other actors in the ex-post implementation stage. Thus, while the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was eager to involve private stakeholders and took measures to increase public participation and transparency during their preparations for the Montreal Protocol, it showed less interest to do so when it came to implementing the Protocol in domestic law. 62 The most effective state organ that has offered "global review services" have been the national courts which have emerged in recent years as key actors in indirectly reviewing decision-making at the global level, using their "gatekeeping" opportunity to reject global policies that they regard as incompatible with domestic law. 63 Reversing a long-held aversion to reviewing global standards and a strong deference towards their executive branches, 64 national courts have in recent years changed course. Probably due to having become more aware of the challenges that the global regulatory structure poses for their domestic democratic processes, and of their ability to act together with their peers in other countries, they have begun to develop tools to respond to foreign and global actors. 65 National courts can invoke several legal sources and doctrines. The ubiquitous response is to rely on the domestic constitution or on a statutory text, but courts have also used international law principles to narrowly interpret the immunities of IGOs 66 or the text of the international standard. 67 In one case a U.S. court found that an international claims commission did not offer adequate protection for a claimant and therefore refused to block her suit based on the private law procedural doctrine of forum non conveniens.
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The assertiveness of the national courts offers "cover" for international tribunals who worry about compliance with their judgments and about retaliation from key member states. If national courts are expected to rule against the IGOs, state executives may be more inclined to tolerate a ruling by the international tribunal to the same effect. 69 The willingness of state organs to intervene in policymaking at the global level holds out the promise of reducing excessive executive discretion at the global level and of improving domestic accountability. These emerging global checks and balances promise to enhance democracy at both levels by helping to ensure that decisionmakers take account of the interests of a greater proportion of the relevant stakeholders and that the outcomes are therefore better informed, including by the voices of foreigners, who are often excluded from domestic and global decision-making processes.
The integration of states into the global regulatory space seems less advantageous for poor countries than strong ones. Obviously, powerful states have greater possibilities to shape policies of global actors by controlling those actors or by acting unilaterally. But there are grounds to believe that coalitions of like-minded states would be able to take an active part in global affairs. The emerging checks offer their best available protection compared to a predatory environment in which weak states often find themselves competing against their peers to satisfy the demands of a powerful external actor who exploits their divisions to pursue predatory policies. Relatively independent judicial bodies, will have opportunities to heed the preferences of voters in those countries by generalizing and rationalizing the international legal landscape and thereby provide weaker states with a stable and interconnected hierarchy of claims-for example, linking trade obligations with human rights concerns-that they can then employ in a variety of venues. The fact that courts are more resilient to economic and political pressures than executives promises that judicial intervention in policy making might be able to improve the protection of the interests of the weak states or their citizens. 70 In addition, powerful states have come to realize that they have stakes in ensuring stability and welfare in weaker states, to avert migration flows, to reduce military threats, and to ensure markets for their products. However, while the growing inter-state friction operates like a global system of competing bodies that can often diffuse power, it is yet to provide a fully effective and equal protection to all. Powerful actors, both public and private, continue to enjoy opportunities to impose negative externalities on others with impunity.
Debates about policy making still require mediation and also finalization though courts. It is therefore important to insist that taking others' interests into consideration is not only a matter of self-interest but also a moral, if not a legal, obligation.
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We are just beginning to realize what taking foreigners' interests into account could mean for states. When states "legislate for humanity" or otherwise form policies that seek to set global standards, it is quite obvious that they should keep in mind the impact of their policies on others, and that they should balance the others' interests against their own. The same rationale should equally apply to situations where state organs regulate domestic activities that potentially have external ramifications. The need to balance their citizens' rights and interests against those of potentially affected foreigners raises novel questions. Take for example the matter of speech that offends religious sentiments of foreigners. Should the foreigners' sensitivities be taken into account? When national laws regulating speech, or treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights require states to subject the freedom of expression to "conditions, restrictions … for the protection of the reputation or rights of others," 78 do they include foreigners in faraway lands who are exposed to the speech by social media? And if so, who defines their "rights"? Beyond textual interpretations, the question remains whether the Trail Smelter principle 83 that stipulates that "no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another" should be extended to cover regulatory decisions that affect also physical and even non-physical harms where the "harm" is a matter for normative assessment. 84 At the very least one could expect regulators to take into account (also) the impact of the regulations on "others" however defined.
V. Conclusion
In our global condominium, for most states, the continued insistence on freedom from external influence imposes isolation on their citizens and prevents them from enjoying a meaningful "freedom to." This "ability to be or to do" is more and more secured by states' and individuals' access to both domestic and global arenas of policy making and review and on the complex interaction among them. Sovereigns that seek to ensure the freedom to to their citizens need to engage proactively with foreign actors, public and private.
The evolution of global governance bodies creates pressures on states for convergence and increase the effectiveness of global and foreign review of national executive action. But sovereign states continue to act as key participants in the robust exchange between global, regional and local policy makers. Thereby they retain their promise of ensuring to their citizens the opportunity to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" in an interdependent world.
